Rush of regret: a longitudinal analysis of naturalistic regrets by Summerville, Amy






The rush of regret: 







Author Biography: Amy Summerville is an assistant professor of psychology at Miami 
University. Her research focuses on how people think about “what might have been,” 
including the experience of regret and the decision to seek information about foregone 
alternatives. 
 
Acknowledgements: I thank Sara Austin for managing participation in this study; Laura 
Brunton, Olivia Krawcyzk, Timothy Miller, Leah Spangler, and Richard Yeager for their 
insights into sororities and assistance in subject payments; Amanda Diekman, Kai 
Epstude, Allen McConnell, and two anonymous reviewers for thoughtful comments on 
earlier versions of this manuscript.   
 
Address correspondence to: Amy Summerville, Department of Psychology, Miami 
University, Oxford, OH 45056. Email: summera@muohio.edu. 
 
In press at Social Psychology and Personality Science 
http://www.sagepub.com/journals/Journal201952
LONGITUDINAL REGRET 2 
Abstract 
The current research examines immediate regrets occurring at the time of a meaningful 
life outcome to better understand influences on real-life regrets. This research used a 
longitudinal approach to examine both initial severity and the rate of change in 
immediate regrets. Initial severity was associated with greater past control over the 
outcome and lower levels of future ability to attain goals relevant to the regret and correct 
the regretted situation.  Regret decreased over time, but less so if it concerned attainable 
ongoing goals.  These contrasting effects of future opportunity on initial severity and 
change over time support a Dynamic Opportunity Principle of regret.  Furthermore, the 
effects of past opportunity and of actions versus inactions on immediate regrets diverged 
from past findings about retrospective regrets. Immediate regrets may fundamentally 
differ from retrospective regrets, and implications for our understanding of regret are 
discussed.   
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The rush of regret: 
A longitudinal analysis of change in naturalistic regrets 
 
What do we regret, and why?  This simple question has spawned extensive debate 
(Beike, Markman, Karadogan, 2009; Gilovich & Medvec, 1995a; Gilovich, Medvec, & 
Kahneman, 1998; Landman, 1993; Roese & Summerville, 2005), which has generally 
examined retrospective regret at a single moment in time: when people recall a regretted 
experience, what factors predict its strength?  The current research moves beyond this 
approach to examine immediate regrets, those identified at the time of an initial outcome, 
rather than retrospective regrets, those identified in hindsight.  Focusing on retrospective 
regrets has inherent limitations: first, true experimentation is impossible, limiting causal 
claims about associated factors; second, because retrospective research captures regret at 
a single moment in time, it is impossible to distinguish between strong regret that has 
faded and moderate regret that has remained unchanged, despite the clear differences 
between the two.  Furthermore, immediate regrets may be particularly important to 
mental health outcomes (Torges, Stewart, and Nolen-Hoeksema, 2008). Given that regret 
is one of the most common emotions (Shimanoff, 1984), understanding the trajectory of 
immediate regret—how regret forms and changes—is crucial.  How does regret 
immediately following an event change over time, and what affects that pattern of 
change?  
Immediate versus retrospective regret 
This research took a longitudinal approach to examine immediate regret reported 
immediately following an outcome.  Immediately after participants were offered or 
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denied membership in a sorority (an extremely meaningful outcome on a campus where 
more than 35% of women belong to sororities), participants were asked about their regret 
about that outcome.  This regret was then tracked over time, allowing an examination of 
change.  
Although some retrospective regrets originate as immediate regrets (e.g., one may 
always regret being the driver at fault in a serious accident) other retrospective regrets 
may emerge years after the presumptive “precipitating event” (e.g., one may regret much 
later in life having spent too little time with one’s young children, despite not identifying 
this as a regret at the time).  Conversely, some immediate regrets may fade into 
nothingness (e.g., one may bitterly regret a breakup until finding a new, more attractive 
partner, at which point the former relationship can be dismissed as “just not meant to 
be.”)  Despite both falling under the overarching category of “regret,” retrospective and 
immediate regrets may nonetheless differ.  Longitudinal research on immediate regret 
therefore represents not only a new approach to studying regret, but a different kind of 
regret than has been the focus of research on naturalistic life regrets (see Sanna & Turley, 
1996, for a parallel discussion of the differences between spontaneous and constructed 
counterfactuals.)  Nevertheless, because research on “what we regret” has largely focused 
on the predictors of retrospective regret, the retrospective regret literature offers an 
important starting place for identifying key predictors of retrospective regret, and thus the 
variables that will be of interest in an initial examination of naturalistic immediate regret. 
Predictors of retrospective regret 
 Existing research has linked levels of retrospective regret to three major 
constructs of interest: future opportunity, past opportunity, and action versus inaction 
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focus.  The present section reviews these findings, which a subsequent section will then 
discuss to form hypotheses about how these constructs influence the initial levels and 
patterns of change in immediate regrets. 
Future opportunity. Competing principles offer diverging predictions about the 
role of future opportunity in regret.  The Lost Opportunity Principle suggests that regret 
is strongest when individuals no longer have the chance to fix the regrettable outcome in 
the future (Beike, Markman, & Karadogan, 2009).  However, a different perspective on 
the influence of future opportunity is driven by a more functional view of regret (Epstude 
& Roese, 2008).  The Future Opportunity Principle argues that regret will be strongest 
where people have future opportunities relevant to the regret. Regret acts as a warning 
signal when pursuing ongoing goals, and facilitates both avoiding mistakes and 
improving outcomes within that domain (Roese & Summerville, 2005).  For instance, an 
individual who regrets that a former relationship ended because of a failure to 
communicate can benefit in future relationships by using that regret as an impetus to 
communicate openly with future partners (Smallman & Roese, 2009). Roese and 
Summerville (2005) argued that “regret persists in precisely those situations in which 
opportunity for positive action remains high” (emphasis mine), suggesting that future 
opportunity to pursue relevant goals will be particularly important in considering the rate 
of change in regret. 
Conflicting effects thus have been reported for future opportunity.  However, 
“future opportunity” has been defined both as the opportunity to attain valued outcomes 
in the area of life containing the regret (career, romance, etc.; Roese & Summerville, 
2005), and as the potential to correct the regrettable situation (Beike, Markman, & 
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Karadogan, 2009).  It is important to note that these two definitions of “future 
opportunity” capture fundamentally different psychological constructs.  The first focuses 
on goal attainability, the presence of other means of attaining a meaningful goal.  In 
contrast, the second focuses on outcome mutability, whether a particular situation can be 
undone.  By way of illustration, these two definitions roughly correspond to the questions 
“Will you ever date again in the future?” and “Could you get back together with your 
ex?” respectively.  Although previous research has not distinguished between these two 
forms of “future opportunity,” past findings suggest that they may have contradictory 
effects, which this research examines directly. 
Past opportunity. Counterfactual thoughts about “what might have been” are the 
cognitive underpinning of regret.  Norm theory, the foundational account of 
counterfactual thinking, established that counterfactuals tend to emerge when one can 
more easily imagine having taken a different path in the past (Kahneman & Miller, 1986). 
Other researchers have found that counterfactual thoughts are most salient for voluntary 
and unconstrained acts (Girotto, Legrenzi, & Rizzo, 1991).  Moreover, these thoughts 
focus on the aspects of a situation that the actor can influence (Markman, Gavanski, 
Sherman, & McMullen, 1995). People thus feel the most regret when they believe that 
they had past opportunity to have made things different (Beike, Markman, & Karadogan, 
2009).    
Actions versus Inactions. Finally, the focus of a regret may influence its initial 
strength and pattern of change.  Specifically, researchers distinguish between regrets 
focused on actions, things someone did that they wish they had not done, (e.g., “I wish I 
hadn’t gone to that party the night before my exam”) versus inactions, things someone 
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wishes they had done but failed to do (e.g., “I wish I had taken French in college”).  
Regrets of action are generally more intense immediately but fade quickly, whereas 
regrets of inaction linger over time (Gilovich & Medvec, 1995a; but c.f. Gilovich, 
Medvec, & Kahneman, 1998), in part because of the greater decay of actions relative to 
inactions in memory over time (Savitsky, Medvec, and Gilovich, 1997).   
Goals of the present research 
This study examines whether four variables that have been previously studied in 
retrospective regret (future opportunity: outcome mutability, goal attainability; past 
opportunity; and action/inaction focus) show the same pattern of influence on immediate 
regret. On the level of general regret about the outcome of the sorority recruitment 
process (i.e., whether the participant got into a sorority, and if so which one), it examines 
perceptions of control and influence over the outcome (past opportunity), as well as 
future opportunity to achieve the goals that led one to join a sorority (goal attainability). 
On the level of a specific regret about a particular incident during the recruitment 
process, it examines the extent to which the individual feels she could have changed the 
outcome at the time the situation occurred (past opportunity), and could still correct the 
situation (outcome mutability). It also examines the influence of whether that regret 
focused on an action (“I wish I hadn’t…”) versus an inaction (“I wish I had…”).   
Given the differences between these two types of regret, it is entirely possible that 
immediate regret could show different relationships to predictors of retrospective regret 
than have been found in previous research. Immediate emotions will tend to fade over 
time, particularly negative emotions (Taylor, 1991).  Moreover, biases about past 
experiences suggest that retrospective regrets will incorporate factors other than those felt 
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at the time of initial regret.  For instance, people see themselves as generally worse in the 
distant rather than recent past (Escobedo & Adolphs, 2010; Wilson & Ross, 2001). This 
research is the first to examine the extent to which past future opportunity (outcome 
mutability and goal attainability), past opportunity, and the focus (action/inaction) of 
regret play the same role in immediate regret as they have been shown to play in 
retrospective regret.  
Future opportunity. Competing predictions emerge for the two forms of future 
opportunity.  Outcome mutability should have a negative association with initial levels of 
regret (Beike, Markman, & Karadogan, 2009). Conversely, Roese and Summerville 
(2005) found that greater goal attainability was associated with greater regret.  However, 
these authors implied that goal attainability primarily had an effect on the change in 
regret, rather than initial levels of regret.  Goal attainability therefore may be less relevant 
to initial levels of regret.  Instead, although regret should generally decrease over time 
(Taylor, 1991), increased goal attainability should be associated with less decrease in 
regret (flatter slope).  Given the null effect of future outcome mutability found by Beike, 
Markman, and Karadogan (2009), this slope effect may not emerge for outcome 
mutability.   
These contrasting effects suggest a Dynamic Opportunity Principle of regret, in 
which future opportunity plays a different role in initial levels of regret and its change 
over time.  Outcome mutability should be negatively associated with initial levels of 
regret, with less opportunity to correct an outcome predicting greater initial levels of 
regret, whereas goal attainability should be positively associated with slope, so that 
greater ability to attain relevant goals leads to greater persistence of regret over time.  
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This principle reflects both that regret results when individuals cannot reverse or alter a 
negative outcome despite the previous potential for a better outcome (Beike, Markman, & 
Karadogan, 2009; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007), and that regret has a learning function 
that leads to its persistence in cases in which it may be useful (Epstude & Roese, 2008, 
Roese & Summerville, 2005). 
Past opportunity. Given the predictions of Norm Theory (Kahneman & Miller, 
1986) and the findings of the Lost Opportnunity Principle (Beike, Markman, & 
Karadogan, 2009), initial levels of regret should be positively associated with past 
opportunity, such that feeling more control over the outcome would lead to more severe 
initial levels of regret.  However, past research offers no clear hypothesis for how past 
opportunity might relate to how regret changes over time. 
Actions versus inactions.  Based on previous work on the time course of action 
and inaction regrets, action regrets should show stronger initial levels of regret than 
inaction regrets.  However, inactions should be associated with less decrease over time 
than actions (Gilovich & Medvec, 1995a). 
Method 
 Eight hundred twenty-six women participating in the second of two weeks of a 
university’s sorority recruitment (“rush”) were invited via email to participate in a paid 
web-based study of “how people evaluate their decisions.”  233 participants completed 
the initial questionnaire within the first three days after sorority invitations were issued at 
the end of the recruitment process (“Bid Day”). 
 After providing informed consent, participants rated the strength of their feelings 
of general regret about “how Bid Day turned out” (5 items, α = .79) and how much 
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control and influence they had over this outcome (past opportunity; 2 items, r = .68, p < 
.001)1 (See supplemental online materials for items).  All ratings were made on 7-point 
Likert scales.  They then indicated their top 3 reasons for wishing to join a sorority (e.g., 
follow family tradition; improve their social standing), whether they could meet those 
goals (goal attainability; 3 items for each of 3 goals, 9 items total, α = .92) and the 
importance of each goal (3 items, α = .61).  
Participants were also asked to recall a specific thought about how something 
from the recruitment process might have been better, using instructions modified from 
Roese and Summerville (2005). This specific regret was coded for whether it contained 
an action or inaction by two trained coders, κ = .64; disputes were resolved by the author.  
Participants rated the amount and strength of regret they felt about this event (2 items, r = 
.82, p < .001), the extent to which they could have acted differently or influenced the 
situation when it happened (past opportunity; 2 items, r = .19, p = .004), and whether 
they could still correct this situation (outcome mutability; 2 items, r = .21, p = .001).  
Participants were asked to return to the website 1 week, 1 month, 2 months, and 3 
months later to complete follow-up questionnaires, and were reminded of each via email.  
In these questionnaires, participants re-rated both general and specific regret.  The event 
description provided after Bid Day was displayed in each questionnaire before 
participants made the specific regret rating.  Participants also re-rated all of the measures 
of past opportunity, future outcome mutability, and goal attainability. 
Results 
 Of the 233 initial participants, 143 participants completed at least 3 of the 4 
follow up sessions (50 completed only the initial survey, 26 completed one follow up, 
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and 14 completed 2).  Mean ratings of each variable within each survey are shown in 
Table 1.  Initial regret was not associated with the number of surveys completed (for 
general regret, r = -.10, p = .10; for specific regret, r = -.07, p = .28).  Missing time points 
are therefore considered missing at random, and all available data points are included in 
these analyses. 
Analytic approach 
In order to account for the presence of multiple measurement points for each 
individual and allow individual variation in initial regret and the degree of change, a 
multilevel modeling approach was used, using HLM software (Raudenbush, Bryk, & 
Congdon, 2007).  Each measurement of regret was represented at the first level of the 
model as a function of the number of days since Bid Day.  For each person, the initial 
amount of regret on Bid Day was represented by an intercept term, and the rate of change 
in regret over time was represented by a slope term.2  For instance: 
L1: Day Level 
Regretij = π0i + π1i(Days since Bid Day)ij + εij 
L2: Person Level 
Intercept: π0i = γ00 + γ01(Past Opportunity)i + γ02(Future Outcome Mutability)i + ζ0i 
Slope: π1i = γ10 + γ11(Past Opportunity)i + γ12(Future Outcome Mutability)i + ζ1i  
Initial Model Fitting 
 Baseline model. The intraclass correlations in an intercept-only baseline model 
were ρ = .72 and ρ  = .79 for general and specific regret, respectively, supporting the 
value of person-level predictors.  Including a linear slope term significantly improved the 
model fit relative to this baseline model, χ2(2) = 48.22, p < .001, and χ2(2) = 89.05, p < 
LONGITUDINAL REGRET 12 
.001, for general and specific regret, respectively. Additionally, the best-fitting models 
discussed below (i.e., models including only the significant predictors) likewise improved 
model fit significantly beyond the linear slope model, χ2(1) = 132.94, p <.001 and  χ2(1)  
= 16.77, p < .001, for general and specific regret, respectively.  
Random effects. For linear slope models of both dependent measures of regret, 
both the intercept (general regret: ζ0j = 1.35, χ2(166) = 1223.41, p < .001; specific regret: 
ζ0j = 1.71, χ2(166) = 1623.00, p < .001) and slope (general regret: ζ1j = 0.01, χ2(166) = 
332.40, p < .001; specific regret: ζ1j = 0.01, χ2(166) = 336.33, p < .001) showed 
significant variance.  The presence of random effects in these parameters supports the 
development of models with level-two predictors, discussed below.  
General regret 
 Initial levels of regret.  Both past opportunity (γi = -1.03, t(204) = 4.39, p < .001) 
and goal attainability (γi= -1.30, t(204) = 9.06, p < .001) were negatively associated with 
initial levels of regret, contrary to predictions.  The more participants believed they could 
have changed the outcome of Bid Day or could still meet their goals, the less regret they 
felt on Bid Day.  Additionally, this effect was qualified by an interaction (γi= 0.14, t(204) 
= 3.81, p < .001).  The greatest initial regret resulted from lower levels of both past 
opportunity and future goal attainability (Figure 1). Separate analysis revealed that these 
two variables were significantly positively associated, r = .36, p < .001. 
Although goal importance and goal attainability were correlated (r = .32, p < 
.001), goal importance was not a significant predictor of regret (γi= 0.73, t(204) = 1.59, p 
= .11) suggesting that it is the ability to meet a goal, and not the goal’s importance, that 
drives this effect (Roese & Summerville, 2005). 
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Change in regret. Overall, regret decreased over time, as predicted (γi = -0.005, 
t(208) = 4.41, p < .001).  Goal attainability was positively associated with slope (γi = 
0.004, t(206) = 3.60, p = .001).  As predicted, as participants reported greater perceptions 
of future ability to meet their goals, they showed less decrease in regret over time (i.e., a 
flatter slope).   Neither past opportunity (γi = 0.001, t(205) = 1.42, p = .16) nor goal 
importance (γi = 0.001, t(205) = 0.58, p = .56) were related to the change in regret.    
Specific regret 
 Specific regret was strongly associated with general regret (r = .70, p < .001).  
However, it showed a distinct pattern of predictors. 
 Initial levels of regret. Outcome mutability was negatively associated with initial 
regret (γi = -0.26, t(215) = 4.58, p < .001; see Figure 2).  Participants who believed they 
had more opportunity to correct the regrettable outcome in the future felt less initial 
levels of regret.  Contrary to predictions, however, past opportunity had no effect on 
initial regret (γi = -0.02, t(214) = 0.30, p = .77). Separate analysis revealed that past 
opportunity and outcome mutability were unrelated, r = .09, p = .17. 
Change in regret. Specific regret also had a negative slope, decreasing over time 
(γi = -0.007, t(216) = 4.63, p < .001).  However, neither past opportunity (γi = -0.0006, 
t(215) = 0.60, p = .55) nor outcome mutability3 (γi = 0.002, t(215) = 1.88, p = .06) was 
significantly associated with slope.  Specific regret decreased equally whether or not 
individuals felt they could have changed the outcome of the event when it occurred or 
could still do so.  
Actions and inactions. Of the 233 events described by participants, 191 (82%) 
could be coded as personal actions or inactions. Of these, 39.9% focused on actions, 
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somewhat less than the even split reported by Gilovich and Medvec (1995a). Contrary to 
predictions, whether a regret concerned an action or inaction did not affect initial levels 
of regret (γi = 0.21, t(175) = 1.00, p = .32) or slope (γi = 0.003, t(175) = 0.99, p = .33), nor 
did this factor interact with either type of opportunity in predicting either initial levels of 
regret (past opportunity: γi = 0.11, t(175) = 0.76 p = .45; outcome mutability: γi = -0.06, 
t(175) = 0.44, p = .65) or the change in regret (past opportunity: γi = 0.0007, t(175) 0.35 p 
= .72; outcome mutability: γi = 0.0005, t(175)= 0.29, p = .77). 
Discussion 
 This research examined predictors of initial levels and change in immediate 
regrets.  Greater outcome mutability and goal attainability, and lower past opportunity 
(for general regret), predicted milder initial levels of regret.  Goal attainability was 
associated with greater persistence of regret over time.  Immediate regret thus follows 
some of the same patterns as retrospective regret, yet also diverges substantially.  
Moreover, these results clarify conflicting results about the role of future opportunity and 
point to the need for a new perspective on this predictor, the Dynamic Opportunity 
Principle. 
Future Opportunity 
Lower levels of outcome mutability and goal attainability were associated with 
greater initial levels of regret, consistent with the Lost Opportunity Principle (Beike, 
Markman, & Karadogan, 2009).  This result mirrors findings in the goals literature: 
blocking a goal has less impact when multiple possible means of attaining a goal exist 
than when the blocked means was only path to goal attainment (Fishbach, Shah, 
Kruglanski, 2004; Kruglanski et al., 2002). Women who wished to develop leadership 
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can join other organizations and will feel less regret than women who hoped to carry on a 
family tradition of membership in a particular sorority and have lost the only opportunity 
to do so. 
The prediction that regret persists in contexts of future goal attainability (the 
Future Opportunity Principle; Roese & Summerville, 2005) was also supported, as 
increased goal attainability was associated with less decrease (i.e., greater persistence) in 
regret over time.  This pattern did not attain significance for outcome mutability 
(consistent with the null results in Beike, Markman, & Karadogan, 2009).   
These results, supporting both of the seemingly incompatible theories of Lost 
Opportunity and Future Opportunity, may seem paradoxical.  However, these results 
support the Dynamic Opportunity Principle: at first, we will feel the most regret when we 
cannot correct an outcome or meet our goals, but over time we will continue to regret 
those things related to the goals we can still meet.  That is, greater initial levels of regret 
will be associated with low outcome mutability and goal attainability (per the Lost 
Opportunity Principle), but greater persistence over time will be associated with greater 
goal attainability (per the Future Opportunity Principle).   
Past Opportunity 
In contrast to predictions that regret requires high past opportunity, greater past 
opportunity was associated with lower initial levels of general regret, and unassociated 
with specific regret. Two of the regret regulation strategies noted by Zeelenberg and 
Pieters (2007) could explain this inverse association: denying responsibility for the 
decision, and reappraising the quality of alternatives. Because the present data examines 
whether participants report past opportunity to control the outcome, participants could 
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deny responsibility for negative outcomes (e.g., “I didn’t get in because this process is 
rigged/biased against people like me”), leading to a negative correlation.   
In line with the second strategy, reappraisal, participants may have used 
perceptions of past opportunity as a heuristic to appraise ambiguous outcomes.  Getting 
into a third-choice sorority could be a negative outcome (not getting into the first choice), 
or a positive one (getting into a relatively preferred sorority when many women fail to 
match with any).  The extent to which individuals feel they had the opportunity to control 
this outcome may lead to different construals of valence.  For specific regret, however, 
soliciting a notable regret could identify an event with less ambiguous valence, thus 
eliminating the need to use other cues.  In line with this suggestion, participants reported 
significantly more regret about the specific event than about the outcome of Bid Day in 
general, t(220) = 2.06, p = .04.  
Why do retrospective but not immediate regrets show a positive association of 
past opportunity and regret? Retrospection may foster a sense of opportunity.  The 
counterfactual thoughts underlying regret can create the perception of control 
(McMullen, Markman, & Gavanski, 1995; Nasco & Marsh, 1999). Moreover, individuals 
retrospectively inflate the feasibility of actions (Gilovich, Kerr, & Medvec, 1993; 
Gilovich & Medvec, 1995b), so this perception of opportunity will be further amplified in 
hindsight. In fact, within the short time span of the present research, participants reported 
increasing perceptions of past opportunity to influence “how bid day turned out,” γ = 
0.006, t(204) = 4.58, p < .001. There was not a significant change for past opportunity to 
alter the specific event, γ = -0.002, t(204) = 1.16, p = .26, suggesting that individuals 
inflate past opportunity in hindsight for broad regrets with many possible causes (“I wish 
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I had a better career”; “I wish I had gotten into a sorority”) but not regrets focused on 
specific situations (“I wish I hadn’t overslept for that interview”; “I wish I had worn a 
different outfit to that party.”)  Although regret definitionally includes a focus on 
personal control (Gilovich & Medvec,1995b; Kahneman & Miller, 1986), these data 
suggest that this perception need not be veridical, just as the experience of envy requires 
only that we believe that another person is better off than us, not that they actually are.  
Instead, engaging in counterfactual thinking about the past may lead us to perceive more 
opportunity in hindsight than we felt at the time, leading to an association of past 
opportunity and regret for retrospective but not immediate regrets. 
Actions versus inactions  
Neither initial levels of regret nor change over time were associated with whether 
the regret concerned an action versus an inaction. Why do actions and inactions differ in 
both initial level and change over time for retrospective regrets, but not immediate 
regrets? One possible explanation for this divergence involves a distinction between two 
types of inaction: “wistful” regrets that are mild but long-lived, and “despairing” regrets 
that are both severe and persistent (Gilovich, Medvec, & Kahneman, 1998).  If the 
reported inactions of current participants were a combination of “wistful” and 
“despairing” regrets, the null effect could in fact reflect two opposing patterns of inaction 
that led to an overall lack of association.  Without an a priori way to identify whether an 
inaction is despairing or wistful, however, this distinction cannot be tested empirically. 
A second explanation is that the inaction effect is a property of the act of 
retrospection and does not extend to immediate regrets.  I suggest that immediate regrets 
of actions and inactions both fade substantially over time, as documented here, but that 
LONGITUDINAL REGRET 18 
inactions emerge as a source of new retrospective regret as time passes (e.g., “I didn’t 
regret it then, but I now regret not studying a language in college”).  In contrast, action 
regrets will not increase over time, since the set of past actions is fixed. Individuals 
decrease attention to situational constraints on their behavior in attributions for distant 
(versus recent) experiences (Moore, Sherrod, Liu, & Underwood, 1979; Peterson, 1980).  
Likewise, past opportunity is inflated in hindsight (Gilovich, Kerr, & Medvec, 1993; 
Gilovich & Medvec, 1995b). Ignoring real situational constraints will make inactions 
more plausible as time passes (e.g., regretting not traveling after college ignores the 
constraints of finances and parental pressures facing new graduates).  In contrast, the 
number of available actions cannot increase, and instead fade from memory (Savitsky, 
Medvec, & Gilovich, 1997).  Even with equal rates of decrease in immediate action and 
inaction regrets, the relative proportion of action regrets (relative to inaction regrets) 
therefore will decrease over time in retrospective regrets because inactions but not actions 
can be replenished in retrospection. Distinctions between actions and inactions in recent 
versus distant regrets (Medvec & Gilovich, 1995a) may therefore represent a function of 
retrospection, rather than a causal temporal pattern.  
Conclusions 
This research offered an initial examination of immediate naturalistic regrets and 
their change over time, finding widely different patterns of influence by opportunity and 
action (versus inaction) regrets compared to previous findings for retrospective life 
regret.  These results suggest that immediate regrets may involve different processes than 
emerge in the retrospective life-regret literature.  Past opportunity, in particular, appears 
to be less central to immediate regret than retrospective regret, whereas the ability to 
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correct an outcome and the relevance of the outcome to attainable goals may be of critical 
importance to the initial severity and the pattern of change in immediate regrets.   
Although the question of what we regret and why remains a complex issue, the 
current research resolves a seemingly intractable debate (whether regret results from lost 
versus future opportunity) by introducing the Dynamic Opportunity Principle, which 
disambiguates the forces that magnify an initial regret (low outcome mutability and low 
goal attainability) from those that shape its change across time (high goal attainability).  
Moreover, it offers an important distinction between immediate and retrospective regret 
that should prove valuable to future attempts to understand this important emotion.  
Hopefully, future research will extend this inquiry to other populations and domains to 
continue to understand the relationship of these related yet distinct types of regret.   
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Notes: 
1 The recruitment process used a multiple-round matching procedure whereby candidates 
submitted subsets of preferred sororities and sororities submitted lists of preferred 
candidates, with candidates remaining eligible only for mutual matches.  In addition to 
impression management during recruitment events, candidates also could engage in 
strategy in selecting which sororities to include on their lists.  
2 Modeling regret at time N+1 as a function of predictors at time N showed the same 
pattern of results as the intercept terms in these models, so these lagged models are not 
discussed further. 
3Although this effect is marginally significant, it remains non-significant even as the only 
predictor of slope, γi = 0.001, t(215) = 1.81 p = .07.  Additionally, including outcome 
mutability as a predictor of both slope and intercept, as opposed to intercept alone, 
substantially worsens the model’s fit, χ2(1) = 7.46, p < .01. 
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Table 1: Mean ratings within each survey  
 
  Initial 1 week 1 month 2 months 3 months 
General regret 2.86 2.62 2.41 2.29 2.23 
Past opportunity 4.20 4.46 4.72 4.80 4.91 
Goal attainability 5.69 5.76 6.03 5.99 6.03 
Specific Regret 3.14 2.56 2.37 2.10 2.26 
Past opportunity 4.30 3.99 3.85 3.82 3.95 
Outcome mutability 3.07 3.29 3.51 3.45 3.43 
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Figure 1 
Predicted values from best-fitting model for general regret 
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Figure 2 
Predicted values from best-fitting model for specific regret 
 
 
 
 
